About - International Conference for Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces (ICOAF)

The Inaugural ICOAF

The first International Conference of Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces (ICOAF) was held in Berlin in 2009, jointly hosted by the German Bundestag’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces and DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. The conference was initiated by the German Parliamentary Commissioner on the occasion of the institution’s 50^th anniversary.

Against the backdrop of growing global efforts to strengthen accountability and grievance redress within the armed forces, the initiative was conceived to take stock of the diverse institutional approaches, promote dialogue on experiences, best practices, and lessons learned, and create the space for international ombuds cooperation. States without ombuds institutions for the armed forces but with an interest in learning from the experiences of others were also invited to participate.

The inaugural conference affirmed the value of continued international dialogue and exchange among ombuds institutions. As a peer-based forum, the conference provided space to inform and strengthen institutional approaches and practices, and enabled members to draw upon a network of practitioners for support and cooperation. Grounded in a shared commitment to strengthening accountability within the armed forces, protecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of service members, and advancing democratic governance of the security sector, ICOAF has, since its inception in 2009, evolved into a recurring international forum for the ombuds community.

About the Ombuds institutions for the armed forces

Ombuds institutions for the armed forces play a vital oversight role in ensuring the transparency, accountability, and democratic governance of the security sector. They contribute to safeguarding the human rights and fundamental freedoms of both armed forces personnel and the civilian populations they are mandated to protect. By receiving and investigating complaints, identifying systemic issues, and issuing targeted recommendations, ombuds institutions help prevent maladministration and human rights violations within or by the armed forces.

In doing so, they address the root causes of institutional dysfunction and violence, provide mechanisms for grievance redress, facilitate mediation efforts, and serve as early warning systems for preventive action. Through their work, ombuds institutions promote inclusive dialogue between military structures, government institutions, and civil society – thereby reinforcing the rule of law and embedding democratic norms within security sector governance (SSG). This contributes not only to more effective and professional armed forces but also to increased public trust and institutional legitimacy.

Ombuds institutions take a variety of forms. Some are specialised and dedicated solely to military oversight, while others are embedded within national human rights bodies with broader mandates. Despite these differences, all share key characteristics: independence, impartiality, and a mandate to prevent and address misconduct within the armed forces.

In democratic societies, an accountable security sector depends on the existence of independent oversight mechanisms equipped with the authority, resources, and institutional safeguards needed to function effectively. Ombuds institutions are therefore essential to building security institutions that are both responsive to democratic norms and resilient in the face of evolving security challenges.

Models of Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces

Ombuds institutions overseeing the armed forces take various institutional forms. While differing in their degree of independence, legal mandate, and institutional design, these models all aim to strengthen accountability, protect the rights of service members, and uphold democratic governance of the security sector. Three broad categories can be distinguished:

1. Inspector General Model

This model is integrated within the armed forces and typically operates under the title Inspector General (IG). IGs are usually—though not always—serving members of the military and generally fall within the chain of command, reporting to or receiving direction from superior officers.

Due to their proximity to military leadership, IGs are often viewed favourably by the armed forces. They are generally more responsive to command-and-control dynamics and attuned to operational imperatives. Their experience within the military structure often translates into deep institutional knowledge, making them well-positioned to understand and address military-specific challenges.

Moreover, because IGs are frequently deployed alongside troops, they may be more accessible to personnel stationed abroad or in remote locations.

However, the integration of IGs within the military hierarchy may raise concerns regarding their independence. Their placement within the chain of command can limit their capacity to address sensitive issues or conduct investigations that challenge senior leadership. This may reduce the credibility of the complaints mechanism and erode trust among complainants and the broader public.

Examples of this model include France, the Netherlands, and the United States, where Inspectors General perform both advisory and mediation functions. Denmark also adopts a similar, albeit distinct, approach.

2. Independent Military Ombuds Institutions

In several countries, legislation provides for a civilian ombuds institution with exclusive jurisdiction over the armed forces. These institutions are independent from the chain of command and operate as external oversight bodies.

Their sole focus on military oversight allows them to develop deep expertise in the field. Their independence enhances credibility among complainants, legislators, and the public, and strengthens the legitimacy of their findings and recommendations.

The ability of such independent military ombuds institutions to issue public reports enhances the oversight capacity of other democratic institutions, such as the legislature, by providing access to information they might not otherwise have, and promotes greater transparency and accountability within the armed forces.

The primary drawback of this model is cost. Establishing and maintaining a dedicated institution may be challenging for states with small or non-active armed forces, where the volume of complaints does not justify a standalone mechanism.

Examples of this model can be found in Norway, Germany, Austria, and Ireland.

3. General Civilian Ombuds Institutions

In some states, oversight of the armed forces is embedded within a broader civilian ombuds institution – typically a national human rights institution (NHRI) or classical ombuds office. These institutions are mandated to address complaints concerning all branches of government, including the military.

Civilian ombuds institutions offer several advantages. Their broad jurisdiction often gives them significant institutional weight, increasing the likelihood that their recommendations will be acted upon. Their prominence in the political system can also enhance public awareness, encouraging both civilians and military personnel to engage with the complaints mechanism.

This model ensures equal treatment of all citizens, both civilian and military, and can be more cost-effective than maintaining multiple specialised bodies. However, general ombuds institutions may lack the military-specific expertise required to address the unique challenges of service members. Their broad mandate can limit their capacity to prioritise defence-related issues, and insufficient resources may result in delayed complaint handling.

To address these limitations, some institutions introduce internal specialisation – for example, by appointing a dedicated deputy or division for military affairs. This approach enhances targeted oversight while maintaining the benefits of an integrated institutional framework.

This model can be found in Serbia, Finland, and Croatia.

DCAF’s Ombuds Programme

DCAF supports ombuds institutions by fostering peer-to-peer learning and exchange, providing bi-lateral capacity building support, and developing knowledge products and resources to guide ombuds practitioners and inform policymakers engaged in oversight and accountability. Activities are carried out across the following four workstreams:

DCAF co-hosts the annual ICOAF conference bringing together ombuds representatives from around the world to share insights and best practices in armed forces oversight.

DCAF provides direct capacity-building support to ombuds institutions, empowering them to effectively oversee and engage with the armed forces.

DCAF strengthens international ombuds cooperation particularly in the context of international missions, through smaller, thematic seminars that facilitate in-depth discussions on emerging security challenges, the unique oversight challenges faced in multinational contingents, coordinated approaches to enhance institutional effectiveness and cross-border cooperation.

DCAF develops knowledge products and resources that provide ombuds practitioners and relevant policymakers with practical guidance, analytical insights, and best practices to enhance oversight and accountability of the armed forces.